Optimizing energy consumption and end-to-end (e2e) packet delay in energy-constrained, delay-sensitive wireless sensor networks is a conflicting multiobjective optimization problem. We investigate the problem from a game theory perspective, where the two optimization objectives are considered as game players. The cost model of each player is mapped through a generalized optimization framework onto protocol-specific MAC parameters. From the optimization framework, a game is first defined by the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to assure energy consumption and e2e delay balancing. Secondy, the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (KSBS) is used to find an equal proportion of gain between players. Both methods offer a bargaining solution to the duty-cycle MAC protocol under different axioms. As a result, given the two performance requirements (i.e., the maximum latency tolerated by the application and the initial energy budget of nodes), the proposed framework allows to set tunable system parameters to reach a fair equilibrium point that dually minimizes the system latency and energy consumption. For illustration, this formulation is applied to six state-of-the-art wireless sensor network (WSN) MAC protocols: B-MAC, X-MAC, RI-MAC, SMAC, DMAC, and LMAC. The article shows the effectiveness and scalability of such a framework in optimizing protocol parameters that achieve a fair energy-delay performance trade-off under the application requirements.
INTRODUCTION
Maximizing the network lifetime while ensuring the application requirements in terms of end-to-end (e2e) delay is challenging in distributed energy-constrained wireless networks such as wireless sensor networks (WSNs), where there is an inherent conflict between the design consideration of the two performance goals. The MAC layer plays a pivotal role in determining the system performance in terms of packet delay and power consumption (network lifetime), as it manages the radio that consumes the largest amount of a node's battery [Doudou et al. 2013] . Energy saving is achieved at the MAC protocol by duty cycling the radio and repeatedly switching it between active and sleep modes. In active mode, a node can receive and transmit packets, whereas in the sleep mode, it completely turns off its radio to save energy. However, forwarding a packet over multiple hops in duty-cycled MAC protocols often requires multiple operational cycles, where nodes have to wait for the next cycle to forward data at each hop. Given the application constraints/requirements in terms of initial energy budget devoted to each individual node and the maximum e2e packet delay tolerated, the choice of a MAC protocol's parameters is of high importance; however, their choice is currently determined by system designers based on repeated real experiences [Ceriotti et al. 2011] or on optimizing one objective subject to other objectives as constraints [Zimmerling et al. 2012; Park et al. 2011] .
In this article, we investigate the inherent trade-off between energy consumption and e2e delay from a game theory perspective. The main result of this work is then to provide a framework that given two well-known system performance requirements, such as the maximum latency tolerated by the application and the initial energy budget devoted to nodes' batteries, it enables the system designer 1 to obtain tunable system parameters that dually minimize latency and energy consumption. In the proposed framework, the players are the performance metrics (energy and delay) instead of the individual nodes that are common in state-of-the-art models that use game theory for optimizing wireless network MAC protocols. The cost function of each player is used by the game theory optimization framework to determine the MAC protocol optimal parameters. Each player threatens the other by using his best optimal point obtained from a noncooperative game in which the player finds his best optimal operating point (i.e., the delay player obtains its lowest delay at the cost of increasing energy consumption), whereas the energy player obtains its lowest energy consumption at the cost of increasing delay. A bargaining game is then defined to find an agreement operational point that satisfies both players. Two bargaining solutions are met: the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (KSBS) . The choice of the NBS model or the KSBS model as a solution is axiomatic dependent. The KSBS model has the advantage of equal proportion of gain between players, and it has a property of fairness between the two performance metrics. The fairness property has its applicability in those cases where the network designer has no preference among the two metrics, while at the same time both application objectives are met. Due to the difficulty of formulating the KSBS optimization problem in its convex form, we propose an algorithm based on iterative NBS resolution, which provides an approximative KSBS solution.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 introduces the general optimization model and the cooperative game theory framework. Section 4 shows how to derive the energy-delay trade-off for the RI-MAC protocol. The optimization results and the NBS and KSBS models are given in this section with some discussions for six illustrative energy-delay efficient MAC protocols: B-MAC, X-MAC, RI-MAC, SMAC, DMAC, and LMAC. All of these protocols and their optimization models, except RI-MAC, are described in Appendix A. In Section 5, we validate the results obtained by the proposed approach through extensive simulations. Finally, Section 6 concludes the article.
RELATED WORK
Performance optimization through protocol modeling is an appealing way to achieve the desired design considerations for any application. Although most energy-efficient MAC protocol solutions for wireless networks follow pure experimental approaches, some works (that are the most relevant to this one) have attempted to model and analyze the protocols. Langendoen and Meier [2010] consider traffic and network models for very low data rate applications and analyze energy consumption and average latency of well-known MAC protocols. Markov models have been developed to evaluate the energy consumption of some MAC protocols, such as SMAC [Yang and Heinzelman 2009] and DMAC [Zheng et al. 2011] . Formal optimization for energy minimization of the SCP-MAC protocol has been investigated by Ye et al. [2006] . Although most models consider single-objective optimization, protocol optimization under application needs in terms of both energy and e2e delay have been considered in Park et al. [2011] and Zimmerling et al. [2012] . However, their approaches are based on optimizing energy subject to constraints on the delay.
Game theory is a practical way to solve many network optimization problems. Different game-theoretical models, including cooperative, noncooperative, Bayesian, differential, and evolutionary games, have been explored to deal with common problems in wireless and communication networks [Han et al. 2011] . Resource allocation and bandwidth sharing have been addressed by many works using game-theoretical approaches, such as Kim et al. [2012] and Pandremmenou et al. [2013] . Route selection problems have been studied by Ortn et al. [2013] , where three games with different levels of complexity have been proposed as a distributed self-configuring solution in multihop wireless systems. Chu and Sethu [2015] propose a cooperative game-theoretical topology control solution that allows a node to choose the set of neighbors with which it communicates directly while preserving global goals such as connectivity or coverage. Game theory has also been used to address energy efficiency and security problems in WSNs [Machado and Tekinay 2008] . Hayel et al. [2014] propose a decentralized optimal protection noncooperative game against virus propagation over a network through a susceptible infected susceptible (SIS) epidemic process. The performance of the equilibria has been evaluated by finding the price of anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. Energy efficiency is also addressed by Voulkidis et al. [2013] using game theory-based coalition formation between spatial correlated sensors that reduces the amount of transmitted packets. Mihaylov et al. [2011] present a game theory mechanism to save a node's energy by playing the win-stay lose-shift (WSLS) game between nodes to schedule radio transmissions. AlSkaif et al. [2015] give a taxonomy of games applied to WSNs.
There is a wealth of literature that studies trade-offs between metrics in networking applying different approaches. One of the most investigated examples is the tradeoff of delay throughput in mobile networks (e.g., in the work of Gamal et al. [2004] and Neely and Modiano [2005] , among others). In these works, mostly based on the Gupta-Kumar fixed traffic model [Gupta and Kumar 2000] or on the GrossglauserTse mobile model [Grossglauser and Tse 2001] , the trade-off between throughput or capacity and delay is investigated under several scenarios, such as the transmission range, interference, number of hops, degree of mobility, and draw throughput-delay scaling trade-off curves. Others like Ying et al. [2008] first characterize the maximum throughput per source destination and then develop a joint coding-scheduling scheme for finding the delay-throughput optimal trade-off. The energy-delay trade-off has been considered by Neely [2007] in multiuser wireless downlink and by Leow and Pishro-Nik [2007] in sensor networks using the stochastic optimal networking model. Zhang and Tang [2013] studied the power-delay trade-off over OFDMA networks and proposed resource allocation schemes to minimize the power consumption subject to a delay quality-of-service (QoS) constraint, expressed in terms of queue length. Zhang et al. [2012] investigate the energy-delay trade-off in a wireless multihop network with an unreliable link model and provide a solution based on a single-objective optimization method for different channel models (additive white Gaussian noise, Rayleigh fast fading, and Rayleigh block-fading). From a game theory perspective, Afghah et al. [2013] propose a Stackelberg game formulation to address spectrum allocation and include fairness and energy efficiency in the game definition. In the same area, Niyato and Hossain [2008] investigate spectrum trading and propose several pricing models in cognitive radio environments. In our case, our approach to achieve fairness is based on the two-person bargaining problem as a way of obtaining a Pareto-efficient point in which two players may find an agreement with an equal proportion of gain.
Numerous efforts have been devoted to address MAC optimization in wireless networks using game theory. Nuggehalli et al. [2008] use game theory approaches to address the QoS support in 802.11 networks, which enables users with high-priority (HP) or low-priority (LP) traffic to fairly negotiate channel access. Similar approaches have been introduced by Bacci et al. [2013] , Ghasemi and Faez [2008] , and Meshkati et al. [2009a Meshkati et al. [ , 2009b to limit the selfish behavior in using the medium resource by end users controlled by the local power level in OFDMA systems, CDMA networks, and wireless networks, respectively. Zhao et al. [2009] propose to use a cooperative game to control the contention window (CW) size of every node, which permits energy saving by estimating the number of competing nodes. Abrardo et al. [2013] propose a noncooperative duty-cycle control game to reduce idle listening time in asynchronous MAC protocols. The energy-delay trade-off is considered by Nahir and Orda [2007] , where multiple cost models (power level, direct/indirect transmissions) are used by each node to determine the Nash equilibrium point for different communication tasks (unicast, multicast, and broadcast) in wireless networks.
All of the preceding works consider nodes as players in the game and attempt to maximize the defined utility function. In cooperative games, the coalition may be achieved by players' coordination through message exchange, and thus the complexity of the solution increases when the number of players involved in the competition scales up. Zhao et al. [2013] propose a game-theoretical solution where the performance goals are considered as peers (players) of the game. This is interesting, because considering the cooperative game between the two system performance objectives makes the complexity of the solution independent from the number of nodes. Although the authors do not deal with WSN but consider the trade-off between load balancing and energy efficiency for traffic engineering in communication networks, their work is most related to the work presented in this article in terms of modeling and shares the way in which the game players are represented. The proposed solution differs from that of Zhao et al. in the way to achieve the fair trade-off point. In fact, Zhao et al. focus on the NBS model and propose an iterative approach to reach the fair trade-off point, which updates the threat values of players by halving on the line that connects (X worst , Y worst ) with the solution of the NBS game at each iteration. 2 The accuracy of their algorithm depends on how close the NBS point is from the KSBS point, which is something that depends on the problem and may not converge at all. Instead, we focus on the fairness using the theory of Kalai and Smorodinsky and propose an algorithm to approximate the 2 (X worst , Y worst ) is the initial threat point of players X and Y. KSBS point from the NBS solution by adequately updating the threat values so that the solution converges to the KSBS point (the fair trade-off).
The optimization framework proposed in this article allows one to achieve a fair trade-off between energy and delay performance for duty-cycled MAC protocols in WSNs. Tunable MAC parameters that enable the achievement of this trade-off are accordingly determined. The proposed framework is based on the energy model derived in Langendoen and Meier [2010] , and it uses the bargaining solution to efficiently balance objectives modeled as virtual players, which is inspired by the model proposed in Zhao et al. [2013] . Another feature of the proposed framework is fairness. In fact, the notion of fairness was defined by Kelly [1997] to allocate resources based on users' rate requirements. From the game theory point of view, fairness was introduced into the bargaining model by Kalai and Smorodinsky [1975] . The KSBS solution keeps three of the axioms required by the NBS and defines an equity constraint linking the utility gains of each player to the player's maximum achievable utilities (known as a claims point) by equalizing proportional gains of individual utilities. The KSBS model was explored by many works to address fair multimedia resource allocation and efficient bandwidth sharing in network traffic management [Park and van der Schaar 2007; Mazumdar et al. 1991] and wireless networks [Chen and Swindlehurst 2012; Bastani et al. 2012] , and lately applied to sensor networks [Pandremmenou et al. 2013; Ma et al. 2011] for resource allocation and coverage efficiency [Truong et al. 2010] . Instead, in this article, we propose to achieve the fair solution of KSBS through iterative NBS applied to low data rate duty-cycled sensor networks. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first that considers the energy/delay trade-off in duty-cycling MAC protocols using game theory.
GAME THEORY FRAMEWORK
In the proposed framework, the key performance metrics are the energy consumption, E, and the maximum e2e packet delay, L. The application requirements expressed as the maximum energy budget per node, E budget , and the maximum allowed e2e delay per packet, L max , are used as inputs for the framework. The framework (Figure 1 ) then builds a system model for energy and delay based on (1) the network and traffic models that permit determination of the topology information and the traffic load at each node and (2) the specified MAC model defined by its operating modes, such as idle, transmission, reception, and sleep modes. The network designer runs the optimization using the game-theoretical framework and obtains the optimal values allowing a network deployment that fulfils the e2e delay and energy budget requirements.
Network and Traffic Model
Let us consider an unsaturated network with low traffic, which is typical in energyconstrained networks (e.g., WSN applications). A typical network model is considered, following the same analysis as in Langendoen and Meier [2010] , where the authors assume an arbitrary topology layered into rings with the sink node located at the center.
3 A spanning tree is constructed where nodes are static and maintain a unique path to the sink, and they use the shortest path routing with a maximum length of D hops (i.e., the depth or number of rings of the tree). We assume a network of N nodes, a uniform node density on the plane, and a unit disk graph communication model with density (average number of nodes), C (i.e., unit disks contain C + 1 nodes (on average)). Refer to Figure 2 , the nodes are layered into levels according to their distance to the sink in terms of minimal hop count, Langendoen and Meier [2010] . The different symbols introduced in the analysis related to the network and traffic model are summarized in Table I with typical values. The neighboring nodes can then be classified as the set of children (input) nodes, I, and the set of overheard (background) nodes, B, such that C = |I| + |B|. Each node at the same level, d, has on average the same input, output, and background traffic. Thus, the average input traffic, 
Radio and MAC Model
The optimization framework requires information about the radio hardware conjointly with the MAC layer model to build the system energy and delay model. The packetbased radio model is consider in our framework. The reason behind this choice is twofold. First, this model is used by most of the well-known hardware platforms, such as MicaZ and TelosB, which both use CC2420 Chipcon [Texas Instruments 2010] . Second, most of the current MAC implementations support this kind of radio that decouples the radio functionality from the link layer. For example, the current implementation of low-power listening (LPL) MAC [Moss and Levis 2008] , which originally was designed for bit-stream radios, supports packet-based radio in the recent versions of TinyOS (Sensors operation system [Levis et al. 2004] ). These facts lead us to adopt the CC2420 radio model (packet based) as defined in Langendoen and Meier [2010] , which models the time needed to power the radio up (i.e., to transit from sleep into active mode), the radio data rate and the time needed for carrier sense (including power-up). The crystal frequency tolerance is another modeled hardware parameter. Due to the low data rate, the clocks of different nodes may drift apart and need to be accounted for. This parameter is very important in MAC protocols, which permits one to compensate for eventual clock drift. The main modeled radio parameters used in this work are summarized in Table I with typical values. Many internal MAC layer parameters are related to the MAC protocol operation. The understanding of the MAC protocol behavior and operation mode is of pivotal importance to determine the role of each parameter. Since the objective of this article is to optimize the MAC parameters that lead to a fair trade-off between energy and delay performance, the main parameters that affect both performances, such as the wake-up period T w , the slot period T slot , or the frame size T frame , can be captured, whereas other details can be left out. By analyzing the operating modes of the MAC protocol, the parameters involved in the delay and energy consumption when the radio is switched between different states (idle listening, transmitting, receiving, and sleeping) can be identified. For example, consider the basic operation modes of the LPL [Hill and Culler 2002] protocol depicted in Figure 3 . Each node, when powered up, performs carrier sensing every wake-up period T w . A node is likely to sleep most of the time to save energy and only wakes up if it has data to send or to check the channel for eventual incoming data packets. If no activity is detected, a node returns back to the sleep state; otherwise, it keeps the radio in the receive state until the data packet header is being detected to determine whether to receive the data. When a node has data packets to be sent, it first samples the channel with a preamble that spans for the whole wake-up period T w to ensure that its receiver can hear the preamble. It can be easily determined that the wake-up period T w is the key parameter that affects both energy and delay performance. The same principal is followed through the article, where six MAC protocols are modeled according to their operation modes and a vector of key tunable parameters that can be optimized are determined and used to derive the energy consumption and the e2e packet delay function of a node. The considered MAC model is mainly based on the analysis provided in Langendoen and Meier [2010] for low data rate applications and is extended for other protocols. We keep the same assumptions regarding the absence of interferences and the low rate constraints, and we provide for each protocol the per-node energy consumption based on the protocol operation modes, the e2e packet delay, and the bottleneck constraint, which can be used as input for the optimization framework. An overview of these six protocols and their internal parameters is provided in Table II (RI-MAC) and Table V (BMAC, XMAC , SMAC, DMAC, and LMAC) for reference.
System Energy and Delay Model
The energy consumption of node n, E n , is defined as the amount of energy consumed by the radio duty of the node in the network according to its location and the amount of traffic it handles. Thus, the node's energy consumption 4 is the sum of energy consumed in each operating mode, which depends on the exchanged traffic load and the MAC intrinsic parameters. For example, let E n idle , E n tx , and E n rx be the energy consumed fractions for node n in idle listening, 5 transmitting and receiving modes, respectively. The node's energy consumption can be calculated as
The normalized energy consumption (in Joules) can be calculated by multiplying the obtained expressions in each mode by the current draws of the radio defined in the datasheet for each mode (e.g., I idle , I tx , and I rx ). In general, for any MAC protocol in the literature, the node's consumed energy is caused by carrier sensing E cs , data transmission E tx , data receiving E rx , and overhearing E ovr , and by sending/receiving explicit synchronization, respectively denoted by E stx and E srx . Given that the network lifetime can be expressed as the expected shortest node lifetime [Zimmerling et al. 2012] , we define the system-wide energy consumption, E, as the maximum consumed energy in the network,
More specific MAC protocols will present other energy consumption terms that should be added to Equation (1).
The e2e packet delay (latency), L n , is defined as the expected time between the first transmission of a packet at node n ∈ N and its reception at the sink. It is then a per-topology parameter in the sense that it depends on the position of the node that generates the data. L n denotes the sum of per-hop latencies of the shortest path, P n , from node n to the sink, where L n l is the one-hop latency on each link l∈P n . The maximum e2e latency, L, is defined as the maximum latency from all nodes to the sink as follows:
The Optimization Framework
Let denote the set of system parameters at the MAC layer that appear in the energy and delay functions, such as sleep length, preambles, and packet sizes. Some of these parameters (e.g., the MAC preamble) are not tunable by the network designer. However, other parameters (e.g., the duty cycle of the sensor) may be fixed by the designer. It is obvious that a long duty cycle reduces the latency but causes more energy consumption at idle state. Given a specific duty-cycle MAC protocol, let X∈ be the vector of system parameters that may be tuned and thus optimized. The following optimization problem is defined for energy consumption minimization:
where L max is the maximum latency tolerated by the application. On the other hand, the following optimization problem is defined for latency minimization: where E budget is the energy budget (maximum duty cycle) that a node consumption cannot exceed for fulfilling a lifetime target. Let us take, without loss of generality, a simple duty-cycled MAC protocol with the length of the wake-up period T w as the single parameter to be optimized (i.e., X = T w ). Prolonging this time enables energy saving, as the energy consumption is proportional to the duty cycle and thus is inversely proportional to the length of the wake-up period (e.g., E ∼ 1/T w ). However, this causes high latency for relaying data to the sink, as it increases the time that every node has to wait for the next hop (parent) node before transmitting the data packet. The perlink latency will be uniformly distributed in [0, T w ] with average T w /2 (plus the time to transmit the packet). Coming back to the problems ( P1) and ( P2), the optimal solution of problem ( P1),
On the other hand, the optimal solution of problem (Figure 4 ). Observing Figure 4 , there is a clear trade-off between minimizing energy consumption and latency in duty-cycled wireless MAC protocols. Deployments in which delay is not a requirement will use optimization problem ( P1) to model the MAC parameters at the cost of increasing delay. Deployments in which energy is not a requirement and low delay is a must will use optimization problem ( P2) to model the MAC parameters at the cost of increasing energy consumption. However, deployments in which both metrics are a must need to find a fair trade-off operational point. To find the optimal trade-off solution for both optimization problems, we define a bargaining problem in which each optimization problem represents a player (i.e., the energy player and the latency player). The bargaining problem is a problem of understanding how several agents should cooperate when noncooperation leads to Pareto-inefficient results. The solution of the problem is one that coincides to the solution that an arbitrator would recommend. Various solutions 6 to the bargaining problem exist, depending on the desired properties of the solution. Two of the most applied axiomatic solutions are the NBS [Nash 1950 ] and the KSBS [Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975] .
The NBS for Duty-Cycled MAC
A bargaining game with two players selects one of the possible player's outcomes of a joint collaboration [Nash 1950; Nissan et al. 2007 ]. Let A ⊂ R 2 be the set of alternatives the players face, let S = {s = (u 1 (a),u 2 (a)) | a ∈ A} be the set of feasible utility payoffs, and let v ∈ S be a disagreement or threat point. Each point in S corresponds to the outcome of the bargaining and specifies the utility for this outcome. The disagreement or threat point, v = (v 1 , v 2 ), represents the value that each player expects to receive if the negotiation breaks down. The goal of the bargaining is to choose a feasible agreement, :(S, v) → S, that results from the negotiation. The NBS considers that S is convex and compact, and there exists an s ∈ S such that s > v for both players. Players have complete information over S, v. The NBS deals with the bargaining game by solving the following optimization problem when there are two players:
The NBS has the following axioms [Nash 1950 ]: (1) Pareto optimality, (2) symmetry, (3) invariant to affine transformations, and (4) independence of irrelevant alternatives. The Pareto efficiency axiom specifies that any bargaining solution, (S, v) , is preferred to a disagreement point. The symmetry axiom specifies that the utilities of the decision makers at the solution are equal if set S is symmetric. The invariance to affine transformations specifies that the solution is independent of the units of the decision makers. Finally, the independence of irrelevant alternatives specifies that if negotiation set S is narrowed to produce a smaller set, say S , then the solution (S , v) = (S, v). The NBS theorem specifies that there exists an optimal solution since S is compact and the objective function is continuous. The uniqueness of the optimal solution is guaranteed when the objective function is quasiconcave. The NBS, (S, v) , is the unique bargaining solution that satisfies the previous four axioms.
Let intervals
be the set of strategies 7 that the energy player and delay player respectively may take, and let s E ∈ A E , s L ∈ A L be the strategies chosen by the players. The threat strategy for the delay player is to play strategy L best , which makes the energy player get E worst . On the other hand, the threat strategy for the energy player is to play strategy E best , which makes the delay player get L worst . Let v E = E worst and v L = L worst be the threat values of each player, where each threat value represents the utility threshold of each player to sign the agreement. If no feasible solution is found, then each player gets a cost (S, v) = ∞. Note that E(X) and L(X) are cost functions instead of utility functions (i.e., signs have to be reversed), and the term (E(X), L(X)) ∈ S represents the intrinsic conditions that each MAC protocol has to fulfill. The (NBS) problem is expressed as:
If a player unilaterally reduces its threat and no feasible solution to the problem (P3-NBS) is found, then each player obtains a cost of ∞. The (NBS) problem ensures that the solution belongs to the Pareto frontier (axiom (i)). This axiom states that a bargaining solution (s * 1 ,s * 2 ) is Pareto efficient if for any other solution (s 1 ,s 2 ) ∈S, then 7 The strategy is chosen by selecting the corresponding system parameters X ∈ . For example, the delay player chooses X = T w , which produces a utility of L best . The delay player is said to choose the strategy L best . (s * 1 ,s * 2 ) ≥ (s 1 ,s 2 ). This condition, then, ensures that there is no feasible point (s 1 ,s 2 ) ∈ S that is Pareto superior to the solution. A Pareto frontier is the set of solutions that are Pareto efficient. Figure 4 (a) shows how the NBS works. Each player can prevent the agreement threatening with a worst value or can reduce its threat looking for a feasible point that satisfies both players. The solution (E * , L * ) of the optimization problem ( P3) where E * = E(X * ) and L * = L(X * ) will be the optimal cost for both players under the agreement. However, although the solution of the Nash bargaining problem lies in the Pareto frontier, the axiomatic solution does not ensure the fairness of the solution. This means that in the obtained solution, one player may reduce/increase its cost/utility more than the other. As Kalai and Smorodinsky [1975] illustrate, let us assume a normalized cooperative game with convex hull in the area S 1 = {(1,0), (0,1), (3/4,3/4)}. The NBS solution with threat point (0,0) is (3/4,3/4). Let us now assume a convex hull in the area S 2 = {(1,0), (0,1), (1,0.7)}. The NBS solution with threat point (0,0) is (1,0.7), but player 2 has reasons to demand more in (0,S 2 ) than he does in (0,S 1 ). A fair tradeoff solution requires that each player reduces/increases its cost/utility function with the same percentage. The KSBS deals with this problem and defines an equity (fair) solution.
The KSBS for Duty-Cycled MAC
The main idea behind the KSBS [Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975] is that each player maximizes its utility while obtaining the same fraction of utility as any other player. Let us define the ideal point 8 b (S,v) as the bargainers' expectations before coming to the negotiation table in the energy-delay game. The KSBS deals with the bargaining game by solving the following optimization problem when there are two players:
The KSBS [Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975] has the following axioms: (1) Pareto optimality, (2) symmetry, (3) invariant to affine transformations, and (4) monotonicity. The KSBS modifies the NBS axioms by dropping the independence of irrelevant alternative axioms and adding the monotonicity axiom. This axiom states that if for every utility level that player 1 may demand, the maximum feasible utility level that player 2 can simultaneously reach is increased, then the utility level assigned to player 2 according to the solution should also be increased. Naming the three first axioms as the standard axioms, Nash [1950] shows that there is a unique standard independent solution, whereas Kalai and Smorodinsky [1975] show that there is a unique standard monotone solution, and both are incompatible. The Kalai-Smorodinsky theorem states that for a pair (S,v), the maximal element of S on the line v to b (S,v) is the solution of the KSBS. In other words, the KSBS point is in the cross point between the Pareto frontier and the line that connects the threat value point and the ideal/aspiration point. Defining the ideal point as b(S,v) = (E best , L best ), and remembering that E and L are cost functions, the KSBS game for the two players (energy and delay) is expressed as
The KSBS solution ensures that the solution belongs to the Pareto frontier and that it lies in the segment that connects the threat point, (E worst , L worst ), to the ideal point, (E best , L best ) (Figure 4(b) ), which provides the following equity solution:
APPLICATION TO A SET OF WSN MAC PROTOCOLS
We apply the optimization framework to six state-of-the-art energy-delay efficient MAC protocols, B-MAC ], X-MAC [Buettner et al. 2006] , RI-MAC [Sun et al. 2008] , SMAC [Ye et al. 2004] , DMAC [Lu et al. 2007] , and LMAC [van Hoesel and Havinga 2004] , as representatives of the main categories of duty-cycled MAC protocols, preamble sampling (B-MAC and X-MAC), beacon based (RI-MAC), slotted contention based (SMAC), and frame based (DMAC and LMAC). These protocols are considered as canonical MAC in Langendoen and Meier [2010] , and we refer to the elaborated survey of energy-efficient MAC protocols available online [MACsoup 2011] , where most of the recent protocols extend upon their canonicals like ContikiMAC [Dunkels 2011 ], A-MAC [Dutta et al. 2012] , and CyMAC [Peng et al. 2011] , which make the analysis valid for them. The choice of these protocols is to exemplify the framework and show its usefulness to optimize different MAC parameters that permit to achieve a fair energydelay trade-off. For the sake of clarity, the formulation derived by the analysis made in Langendoen and Meier [2010] is used. Some of the formulas were obtained by original authors of the proposed protocols, whereas others are derived in that work. For the sake of space reduction, we summarize the formulation of only the RI-MAC protocol; those of B-MAC, X-MAC, SMAC, DMAC, and LMAC are given in Appendix A. The results of optimization and simulations are provided for the six MAC protocols. 
Protocol Description
RI-MAC (beacon based) [Sun et al. 2008 ] is a receiver-initiated asynchronous protocol that tries to reduce the amount of time a pair of nodes occupy the medium by preambles before they reach a rendezvous time for data exchange. This is to reduce the global network delivery delay. Every node periodically wakes up and broadcasts a beacon after T w (1) ( Figure 5 ). When a node wants to send a data packet, it stays silently active for a period of T wait (2) until the wake-Up of its receiver, and it starts contending to send its packets upon receiving a beacon from its receiver (3). Multiple nodes can contend in the CW's T cw , where the receiver keeps its radio on waiting for eventual data packets and returns back to sleep after T timeout . The winer among the contending nodes transmits the data packet, T data , which spans for the transmission of the header and the payload (4). The receiver acknowledges the data packet with another beacon that spans for the transmission of the wake-up beacon T ack = T beacon (5). Note that this beacon's role is twofold. First, it acknowledges the correct receipt of the sent data packet. Second, it invites for new data packets from other senders before returning back to sleep.
Following the defined energy model in Section 3.3, the energy consumption is modeled by the effective duty cycle (i.e., the fraction of time the radio is switched on). Knowing the duty cycle, the node's lifetime can easily be determined given the current draws, I on and I off , of the radio in active and sleep modes, respectively. For example, let E n be the effective duty cycle (energy consumption), and let Q be the battery capacity of a node n; then, the node's lifetime can be calculated by T n = Q/(E n I on + (1 − E n )I off ) [Zimmerling et al. 2012] . This allows one to omit the physical energy consumption expression and only focus on the effective duty-cycle aspects [Langendoen and Meier 2010] . Following the RI-MAC operation model, the key adjustable parameter that affects the energy and delay performance is the wake-up period T w . The vector parameter for RI-MAC protocol is thus given by X RI-MAC = [T w ]. The per-node energy consumption based on the protocol operation modes, the e2e packet delay, and the bottleneck constraint 9 are provided in the following equations (a description of every term used in the formulas can be found in Tables I and II) and data reception, E rx , and in the traffic overhearing mode, E ovr 10 :
where
The energy consumption, E n , is a per-node function that depends on the intrinsic parameters of the MAC protocol and the traffic it generates and relays. Therefore, since nodes belonging to the same ring d will generate and relay, on average, the same traffic, they will consume the same energy.
(b) The delay of node n at level d. The average e2e delay of a node is determined by the summation of one-hop delays, which include the waiting time before the receiver wakes up, the time to receive the beacon, the contention time, and the time to send and acknowledge the data packet:
where T data = T hdr + P/R. Again, all nodes at the same ring d will have the same average e2e delay.
(c) The bottleneck constraint:
where I 0 is the number of input links at level 0 (at the sink). From Equations (4) through (6), the following system-wide energy-delay functions are defined where the nontunable parameters are grouped as constants:
(a) The network energy consumption function:
The e2e packet delay function:
+ T data + T ack ). Let us define the network lifetime as the time until the first battery exhaustion of any node. Nodes that are placed in the nearest ring to the sink (d = 1) are the ones that convey more traffic toward the sink, as they have to forward their own traffic and the traffic that flows from all other rings (d > 1). These nodes are the most energy consuming and will be the first ones to die. Since all nodes at d = 1 have the same traffic on average, Equation (7) reduces to
with η 1 , η 2 , and η 3 having
10 The duty cycle is calculated by multiplying the time spent in a given mode by the frequency of its occurrence (e.g., 1/T w , F n out ).
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with ε 1 = D/2 and ε 2 = D(T beacon +
T cw 2
+ T data + T ack ).
Framework Application
Before applying the game theory framework, the energy consumption and the e2e delay resulted in different values for the wake-up period T w , the slot size T slot (T slot = T sync +T active +T sleep ), and frame size T frame of B-MAC, X-MAC, RI-MAC, SMAC, DMAC, and LMAC are plotted in Figure 6 . It can be observed that each protocol reduces its average e2e delay at the cost of rising energy consumption, and vice versa, as predicted in Figure 4 . For analyzing this trade-off, the general optimization problems ( P1) and ( P2) are first used to determine the best parameters' values that permit the achievement of optimal energy and delay objectives. In the following, RI-MAC is used as a baseline example for the framework application. The network designer, with the knowledge of the network topology and the sampling rate, may characterize functions for the energy consumption, E RI-MAC , and e2e delay, L RI-MAC , as described in Equations (9) and (10). The objective of the network designer is to obtain the optimal value for the tuning parameter, T w , that minimizes energy consumption and e2e delay in a fair manner. For that purpose, the specific energy consumption optimization problem ( P4) is first defined to obtain the threat value v
worst . Second, the specific e2e delay optimization problem ( P4 ) is defined to obtain the threat value v
worst . The NBS optimization problem ( P4 * ) is then defined and solved. Finally, the KSBS is solved with a heuristic from the NBS optimization problem. The optimal value, T * w , used by the network designer is the value given by the optimization problem ( P4 * ) if the NBS axioms are met or the value given by the heuristic if the KSBS axioms are met.
Energy Optimization.
Given the application requirements in terms of e2e packet delay bound L max , energy optimization derives optimal MAC parameters that give the minimal network energy consumption subject to L max :
Equations (9) and (10) n , with c ≥ 0 and a ( j) ∈ R for j = 1, . . . , n, whereas posynomials are the summation of monomials. In other words, an expression of the type
is a geometric optimization problem that is nonconvex and nonlinear. A geometric problem is a problem in which the objective function and the inequality constraints are posynomials and the equality constraints are monomials. Geometric problems may be easily transformed to convex problems [Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004 ] using a logarithmic change of variables and a logarithmic transformation of the objective and constraint functions. Let us define vector a k = (a
is transformed in a log-sum-exp function of the type log It may be easily proved that log-sum-exp functions are convex, and then optimization problem ( P4) may be transformed in a convex form. Solving now problem ( P4), the optimal point X * RI-MAC = [T * w ] is obtained, the optimal value of ( P4) is E
RI-MAC best
= E RI-MAC (X * RI-MAC ), and the corresponding e2e packet delay is obviously nonoptimal, L RI-MAC worst = L RI-MAC (X * RI-MAC ). Energy optimization for B-MAC, X-MAC, SMAC, DMAC, and LMAC protocols is provided in Section A.2.1 of the Appendix by solving problems ( P5), ( P6), ( P7), ( P8), and ( P9), respectively. Problems ( P5) through ( P8) again are geometric optimization problems. On the other hand, the energy consumption for LMAC is in the form of a sum of linear fractions, and optimization problem ( P9) is not a geometric optimization problem. However, this problem may be transformed to an equivalent convex problem using a primal-relaxed dual global optimization approach [Floudas and Visweswaran 1993; Benson 2004] . Floudas and Visweswaran [1993] propose a deterministic global optimization approach for nonconvex constrained nonlinear programming problems. The idea is to decompose the original nonconvex problem into primal and relaxed dual subproblems by introducing new transformation variables, if necessary, and partitioning of the resulting variable set. Partitioning of the variable set means to divide the variable set into two parts in such a way that the objective and constraint functions are convex for one part of the variables given that the other part is fixed. Then, the projection of the problem into the space of a subset of the variables results in a convex programming problem. The method is useful in quadratic optimization problems with linear and/or quadratic constraints, as well as in optimization problems involving polynomial functions of one or more variables in the objective function and/or the constraint set. Since the primal problem still may be nonconvex in the projected set, Floudas and Visweswaran [1993] propose the use of the dual representation and the relaxation of the constraint region for the problem, thus obtaining a lower bound for the solution to the problem. Finally, iterating the process, a global solution is determined. Benson [2004] applies the process of Floudas and Visweswaran [1993] to a nonconvex optimization problem with a sum of linear fractions. Let us consider the following optimization problem:
where X ⊆ R n is a nonempty, compact convex set and a 
Then, x * is a globally optimal solution for problem ( PN) if and only if for some y * ∈ R K , (x * ,y * ) is a global optimal solution for the problem:
Finally, Floudas and Visweswaran [1993] give an algorithm that solves optimization problems such as ( PN1) via branch and bound.
Figure 7(a) shows the optimal solution obtained for each protocol when varying the delay bound L max from 500ms to 3,000ms using the network topology model and traffic model described in Section 3.1. Optimization problems ( P4) through ( P8) have been solved using CVX, a Matlab-based modeling system for disciplined convex optimization that supports geometric programming (GP) [Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004] . Optimization problem ( P9) has been solved using the Benson [2004] primal-relaxed dual global optimization approach. It is observed that by relaxing the L max constraint, the energy consumption is lowered for all MAC protocols until a given value of L max where there is no space for improvement. The difference between protocols is due to the intrinsic design of the MAC protocols, which is outside the scope of this article. (DMAC and LMAC) increase as the e2e packet delay bound L max increases. From the figure, it can be observed that the increase at the beginning was proportional to the e2e delay bound (low values of L max ), but it becomes stable for some protocols. This means that relaxing the e2e delay bound beyond those values has no effect on the energy optimization parameters and the consumed energy. The reason again is due to the intrinsic behavior of the MAC protocols. For example, taking the RI-MAC protocol, relaxing the L max bound would allow one to increase the T * w , and thus the node would stay longer in the sleep mode, saving energy. However, a transmitting node would have to wait in the idle state for more time to transmit a packet, increasing the energy consumption. Similar behavior occurs with the other MAC protocols. 
Delay
Optimization. Now, given the application requirements in terms of maximum energy budget E budget expressed as the maximum allowed duty cycle, we are interested in finding the optimal MAC parameters that give the minimum e2e packet delay subject to the maximum energy budget:
The delay optimization problems ( P4 ) through ( Figure 8(a) shows the optimal solution obtained for each protocol when varying the maximum energy budget E budget from 1.2% to 20%. The e2e packet delay is lowered for all MAC protocols as the maximum energy budget increases up to a given value, from which there is no more delay reduction for some protocols, such as B-MAC, X-MAC, and RI-MAC. The difference in e2e packet delay between both protocols is again due to the intrinsic design of the MAC protocols, which is outside the scope of this article. (DMAC and LMAC) as a function of the energy budget E budget . The figure shows that the decrease is significant at the beginning (low values of E budget ), but it becomes insignificant as E budget increases. This means that increasing the maximum energy budget beyond those values has no effect on the delay optimization parameters and the achieved delay. The The problem (P3-NBS) is nonlinear and nonconvex, but this kind of problem can be transformed into a standard convex optimization problem without changing its solution [Zhao et al. 2013 ]. The idea is to define auxiliary variables E 1 and L 1 such that E 1 ≥ E i (X) and L 1 ≥ L i (X), which should be satisfied by the optimal solution. The proof comes from the fact that to attain the maximum in the objective function, E 1 and L 1 have to be minimum and thus be equal to E i (X) and L i (X), respectively (second constraint). Moreover, since E i (X) and L i (X) are less than or equal to (E i worst , L i worst ) (first constraint), the solution is feasible whenever the problem (P3-NBS) is feasible, and application of (P3-NBS) to the MAC protocols yields a concave problem: Consequently, the equivalent concave problem for RI-MAC is as follows: 12 Whenever a player has larger gain than the other, this occurs because its threat point is better than its adversary's threat point. Thus, the player with lower gain has to decrease its threat value 13 , whereas the player with larger gain maintains its threat value. Let (E k , L k ) be the optimal point obtained by the NBS model at the k-th step. The objective is to use a new initial threat value (E k 0 , L k 0 ) such that the new NBS optimal point approximates the KSBS optimal point. Figure 9 (a) illustrates how the solution is obtained. Let the error δ k be defined as the difference between the gains obtained by each player at the k-th step using the NBS model:
Energy-Delay
12 The point (E worst , L worst ) is a first candidate as the initial threat point (E 0 0 , L 0 0 ). However, since the Pareto frontier is convex, the middle point (
) also lies in the line connecting (E worst , L worst ) and (E best , L best ), and it is nearer to the optimal KSBS point. Thus, selecting this point as the initial threat point will speed up the convergence of the algorithm. 13 Decrease the threat value because L and E are cost functions. 
and the optimal corresponding parameters X * . Set as a stop criterion value;
Now, the threat value of the player that results in less gain is decreased by a factor corresponding to the absolute difference between the gains obtained by each player at that iteration. This is illustrated in Algorithm 1 and Figure 9 (a). In the first step, the NBS optimal point is obtained from the initial threat point (E 0 , where δ 0 is the difference between the two obtained gains. In the following steps, the threat point of the player that obtains less gain, in our example the delay player, is decreased proportionally to δ k . The new NBS optimal points with the new threat points converge to the KSBS optimal point. Figure 9 (b) and Table III show how the proposed algorithm converges fast after eight iterations for the SMAC protocol with an error lower than 10 −5 , where , and ( P9 * ) 14 for the network topology described in Section 3.1 using Algorithm 1. The E budget has been fixed to 50%, and L max has been varied in the interval [500, 3000] ms. Figure 12 (a) through (f) plot the results obtained by solving the same problems when fixing L max to 3, 000ms and varying the E budget in the interval [1.2, 20]%. As it can be observed from Figure 10 , relaxing the e2e packet delay bound (L max ) will result in a new application requirement configuration for every protocol, and the game leads to an agreement at different tradeoff points. Decreasing the L max value for a fixed E budget produces a lower L worst value and thus a smaller interval [L best , L worst ]. This results in a shorter space for gain (e.g., trade-off points with letters a, b, c). On the other hand, when L max increases, L worst also increases, which produces a large interval [L best , L worst ]. This gives space for a large gain improvement (e.g., trade-off points with letters g, h, i). Moreover, the energy gain is proportionally equal to the latency gain. Thus, any energy gain is constrained by L max . Figure 11(a) through (d) show how the correspondent optimal parameters increase as L max increases (i.e., increasing L max allows low duty cycles).
A similar behavior occurs when L max is fixed to 3, 000ms and E budget is varied (Figure 12(a) through (f) ). Small values of E budget produce small values of E worst and then short intervals of [E best , E worst ]. This results in limited gains (e.g., trade-off points with letters a, b, c). Large values of E budget produce large values of E worst and then long intervals of [E best , E worst ]. This results in larger gains (e.g., trade-off points with letters h, i, j). Figure 13(a) through (d) show how the correspondent optimal parameters decrease as E budget increases. In other words, increasing energy budgets allows for high duty cycle designs.
10:24 M. Doudou et al. Fig. 11 . The obtained optimal parameters using the KSBS model: (a) the wake-up period T * w for B-MAC, X-MAC, and RI-MAC, and (c) the active period T * active and sleep period T * sleep for SMAC, and (d) the synchronization period T * sync for DMAC and (e) the frame size T * frame for DMAC and LMAC as trade-off points for different values of maximum e2e delay bound L max ∈ [500, 3000]ms. 4.2.5. NBS and KSBS Gains. The gain obtained by energy consumption and e2e delay players in the KSBS game is plotted in Figure 14 . The gain is expressed in Equation (3). It illustrates how much each player has proportionally reduced its cost, starting from its worst-case value until each one achieves the agreement point. Figure 12 (a) depicts the gains of different MAC protocols when the maximum e2e delay bound, L max , is varied between 500 and 3,000 ms and when E budget is fixed to 50%. Figure 12 (b) depicts the gains obtained when the maximum energy budget, E budget , is varied between 5% and 15%, and L max is fixed to 3,000ms. The figure shows increasing gain with the delay bound increase, as well as the energy budget increase. The different MAC protocols behave differently as the application requirements, L max and E budget , are modified. On one hand, all MAC protocols have obtained similar gains for large values of L max (larger than 1,500ms), whereas for lower values of L max (500 to 1,500 ms), B-MAC, DMAC, and SMAC have achieved better gains compared to X-MAC, RI-MAC, and LMAC. In fact, to satisfy the constraint on the small values of L max (in problem ( P1)), each protocol attempts to minimize the energy while ensuring the e2e delay bound. For instance, following the design of B-MAC, SMAC, and DMAC, respectively, this constraint forces B-MAC to use small wake-up periods, as its one-hop delay spans for a whole wakeup period (the size of the long preamble). The same constraint requires that SMAC increases its active period and DMAC increases the size of active slots, as packets in intermediate nodes can only be forwarded during these periods. Otherwise, these packets will be delayed to the next operating cycle. As a result, these protocols increase their energy consumption. The application of the game theory optimization framework enables the energy player to considerably reduce its cost value at the cost of relaxing the e2e delay cost. On the other hand, most of the MAC protocols, except LMAC, have achieved similar incremental gains when the E budget of each node is relaxed. This is because the solution of problem ( P2) will give lower values of L best and higher values of E worst . However, following the design of the LMAC protocol, each node randomly chooses one transmission slot and communicates it to its neighbors and must perform carrier sensing in each slot to check for eventual incoming data packets. This makes the duty cycle of nodes high (over 9% in Figure 6 ) compared to other MACs, and varying E budget in 5% to 15% will not allow for better e2e delay reduction L best due to the constraint on the maximum energy budget (see ( P9 )). The solution of problem ( P1) will make all MACs use longer sleep periods (due to the increase in the wake-up period for B-MAC, X-MAC, and RI-MAC; the sleep period for SMAC; and the frame period for DMAC and LMAC), which results in low E best and high L worst . Consequently, the application of the game theory optimization framework will enable the delay player to reduce much from its cost value at the cost of relaxing the energy cost. From the comparison between NBS and KSBS models, the gains obtained by the energy consumption player and the e2e delay using the KSBS and the NBS models for all duty-cycled MAC protocols are plotted in Figure 15 (a) and (b) for different maximum delay and budget thresholds, namely (15%, 1,200ms) and (30%, 3,000ms). It is clear that the use of each model depends on the assumption on whether the players follow the independent axiom defined by Nash or the monotonicity axiom defined by KalaiSmorodinsky. We believe that in the energy-delay game, there is no preference for any of the players, and thus the proportional solution to the KSBS model gives a definition of fairness between players.
KSBS Optimal Points Versus Sampling Rate (F s )
Another important factor in the proposed optimization framework is the sampling rate, which is an application-dependent parameter. Note that our traffic model is designed for very low data rate sampling applications. A sampling rate above a given threshold may not result in the desired trade-off between energy consumption and the e2e delay objectives. In the following, we study how the sampling rate impacts the optimization model. Table IV shows the obtained sampling rate thresholds for different MAC protocols when the maximum e2e delay bound and the maximum energy budget are L max = 5000ms and E budget = 50%, respectively. The consider network contains 200 nodes, where the node density is fixed to C = 8 and the network depth has been set to D = 5 levels. The thresholds are mainly defined by the bottleneck constrains for every protocol. From the table, the obtained thresholds were 1pkt/2min for B-MAC, 1 pkt/min for X-MAC, 1 pkt/20min for RI-MAC, 2 pkt/min for SMAC, 1pkt/5min for DMAC, and 2 pkt/min for LMAC. The results reveal that each MAC protocol has its own maximum sampling frequency defined by its bottleneck constrain over which the trade-off point cannot be reached for the given application requirement configuration. On the other hand, playing with the sampling rate under the maximum threshold can lead to different trade-off points between the two performance metrics (energy and delay), as decreasing the sampling rate will consume less energy, which gives more optimization space for both players. Given the same application requirements configuration (L max = 5000ms and E budget = 50%), we run the optimization framework for each MAC protocol and vary the sampling rate F s ∈ [1/10, 1/60]pkt/min. Figure 16 (a) and (b) plot the energy consumption E * and the average e2e delay L * corresponding to each obtained trade-off point for different sampling rates. The results show that decreasing the sampling frequency gives different behavior depending on the intrinsic definition of the MAC protocols. For example, SMAC and LMAC obtain flat responses with respect to the sampling frequency. In fact, the traffic rate threshold of SMAC and LMAC is 2pkt/min (Table IV) , and varying the traffic in [1/10, 1/60] pkt/min has less effect on the duty cycle of SMAC and LMAC, which is mainly impacted by the active period duration and the carrier sensing in each slot for SMAC (see Section A.1.2 of the Appendix) and LMAC (see Appendix A.1.3), respectively. As a consequence, decreasing the traffic rate under 1/10 pkt/min will not enable for more energy saving and thus no more optimization space for SMAC and LMAC under these configurations, whereas reducing the traffic rate from 1/10 to 1/60 pkt/min has allowed for more energy saving, in transmitting/receiving modes (E tx and E rx , respectively), for other MAC (B-MAC, X-MAC, RI-MAC, and DMAC) protocols. This will give more optimization space for both players and consequently will result in different trade-off points for these protocols (Figure 16(a) and (b) ).
Scalability of the Solution
The network depth and the node density (D and C in Table I ) are two other system parameters that can affect the system optimization, and they have a direct relation to the scalability of the solution. In this article, a two-player game is defined, which is independent of the number of nodes and the topology of the network. Topology and number of nodes impact in the delay and energy equations, and mainly the bottleneck conditions of each protocol that fix the applicability of the model. To show the effect of the network topology, we have run the optimization framework for every MAC protocol under several network depths (D). The sampling rate has been fixed to 1pkt/30min and the application requirements L max and E budget to 5,000ms and 40%, respectively. D has been varied from 5 to 12 levels, which results in a network size from 200 to 1, 152 nodes, and the density has also been fixed to C = 8. Figure 16 (c) and (d) plot the energy consumption E * and the average e2e delay L * , corresponding to each trade-off point obtained for the different network depths. It can be observed from the figure that both players increase their cost functions to reach the desired trade-off. This is because increasing the network depth increases the e2e average delay, as this yields routes with more hops and increases the amount of packets that the nodes at the first level have to relay. In other words, changing the topology, the aggregated sampling rate is increased and the e2e delay equations are modified, but this has no effect on the convergence or complexity of the game model. The most interesting is that the framework is still able to find the trade-off points even in large networks, which makes the model appropriate for arbitrary network sizes.
RESULTS VALIDATION
Protocol optimization and the optimal parameters that permit achievement of trade-off between the energy consumption and the average e2e delay performance metrics are evaluated in this section through an extensive set of simulations under the traffic, network, and radio models defined in Section 3. The objective is to show the closeness of analytical results from the simulations. All of the optimized MAC protocols are implemented using a TinyOS operating system [Levis et al. 2004] , and the evaluation is carried out with simulations using TOSSIM [Levis et al. 2003 ] (the TinyOS simulator). A very low data rate is considered ([0.01, 10]pkt/min. The simulated network topology is depicted in Figure 2 , where nodes are uniformly deployed with unit disk of C = 8 (the density), and the number of levels in the network is set to D = 5 (the network depth). Tables I and II sketch all of the setup configuration parameters of the network and traffic models, as well as the typical parameter values for the CC2420 radio. In the simulation, a phase of neighbor discovery and tree construction with minimum hop-count routes, according to the network model of Section 3.1, is executed before entering the sampling phase. In this phase, every node periodically generates traffic (i.e., a packet) with frequency F s = 1pkt/10min. A node either transmits its local data or forwards data packets being received to the base station located at the center of the network. The validation has been performed using the NBS model described in Section 4.2.3. 15 The network is layered into levels and packets are forwarded from outer to inner levels until reaching the sink node. Every simulation is repeated at least 33 times, and each point in the following curves comes from the average result of all experiments, where bars are represented with a 95% confidence interval.
Average e2e Delay Versus Max Delay Bound (L max )
As the framework has two different application-specific requirements inputs-the maximum e2e delay bound and the maximum energy budget-we have applied and tested the proposed framework for different configurations of these application requirements. In the first scenario, the MAC protocols are optimized where the trade-off points for different values of the maximum e2e delay bound were found. The protocols are then tuned and simulated with the optimal optimization parameters obtained by solving problems ( P4 * ), ( P5 * ), ( P6 * ), ( P7 * ), ( P8 * ), and ( P9 * ) when fixing the maximum energy budget E budget to 50% and varying the maximum e2e delay bound of the application L max ∈ [500, 1600]ms. The average e2e delay of the network is measured and plotted in Figure 17 (a) for B-MAC and X-MAC, in Figure 17 (b) for RI-MAC and SMAC, and in Figure 17 (c) for B-MAC and X-MAC protocols. It can be observed from the figure that the average e2e delay of the network increases by increasing the maximum delay bound L max of the application. The figure shows that all protocols have raised their average e2e delay: 47% for B-MAC, 95% for X-MAC, 68% for RI-MAC, 81% for SMAC, 62% for DMAC, and 77% for LMAC when relaxing the maximum e2e delay bound L max from 500 to 1,600 ms. This can be explained by the increase in the wake-up period T w , the sleep period T sleep , and the frame size T frame parameters to reduce energy consumption in favor of the energy efficiency player. In fact, the e2e delay is considered the sum of the one-hop delay along the path toward the sink. Since each node must wait half the wake-up time of its receiver on average before sending the data packet, the increase of this parameter (the wake-up time) when relaxing the e2e delay bound yields the increase in the one-hop delay and thus in the average e2e delay. It is clear from the figure that the obtained e2e delay in simulation is similar and their plots have the same shapes as those obtained analytically. The closest result has been obtained for X-MAC, SMAC, and DMAC. The e2e delay B-MAC has some fluctuations that can be due to the randomization of the wake-up times of nodes. The e2e delay of RI-MAC is more fluctuating, and this can be explained by the losses in beacon transmissions that result in increased delays. Finally, LMAC has a simulation e2e delay a bit higher than the one obtained analytically. This is due to the position of transmission slots in the frame, where each node randomly chooses one slot to send its data (see Figure 25 ). Figure 18 shows results for the same setting (E budget = 50% and L max ∈ [500, 1600]ms), but it plots the maximum energy consumption (duty cycle) as L max varies: Figure 18(a) for B-MAC and X-MAC, Figure 18 (b) for RI-MAC and SMAC, and Figure 18 (c) for B-MAC and X-MAC. The figure shows that the measured energy consumption, which is the maximum consumed energy in the network, decreases with the increase in the maximum delay bound L max of the application. This is due to the increase in the wake-up period T w , the sleep period T sleep , and the frame size T frame . All protocols have achieved clear reduction in their respective duty cycles (over 34%), which reduces energy consumption. Referring to Table V, which sketches the obtained results, the reduction was −34% for B-MAC, −43% for X-MAC, −45% for RI-MAC, −41% for SMAC, −46% for DMAC, and −42% for LMAC. Furthermore, the measured energy consumption is quite close to the analytical results for all protocols.
Energy Versus Max Delay Bound (L max )

Average e2e Delay Versus Max Energy Budget (E budget )
Now, the maximum e2e delay bound, L max , is fixed to 1,600ms, and the maximum energy budget devoted to each node in the network, E budget , is varied in the interval [1.25, 15]%. The MAC protocols are configured with the optimal values obtained by solving problems ( P4 * ), ( P5 * ), ( P6 * ), ( P7 * ), ( P8 * ), and ( P9 * ). The resulting average e2e delay in the network is measured and plotted in Figure 19 (a) through (e) for all protocols. It can be observed from the figure that the average e2e delay of the network decreases when allowing nodes to increase their duty cycle through relaxing the maximum energy budget of the application (E budget ). This is achieved by decreasing the wake-up period T w , the sleep period T sleep , and the frame size T frame such that each node can quickly reach its receiver, which reduces the one-hop delay. The cost of increasing the duty cycle by the energy player goes in favor of the e2e delay player. The reduction in the e2e delay of each protocol when increasing the maximum allowed duty cycle is shown in Table V , which varies between −18% and −54%. The measured e2e delay from the simulations are close to the analytical e2e delay for all protocols. It can be observed that the protocols with the most convergent results are X-MAC, SMAC, and DMAC. Lower active periods T active cause some packets to be delayed, which explains the large average e2e delay for SMAC (for low values of E budget ). The e2e delays of B-MAC and RI-MAC have some fluctuations for reasons explained earlier, whereas the e2e delay of LMAC is a bit over that of the analytical model. This may be explained by the randomness of the reception slot position in the transmission frame.
Energy Versus Max Energy Budget (E budget )
Finally, the maximum consumed energy in the network is also measured during the simulations, and the results are depicted in Figure 20 (a) through (e) As expected from the analytical results and confirmed by the simulations, the figure shows that the nodes increase their duty cycle (between +5% and +65%) when they are allocated more energy budget, E budget . This loss in energy savings goes in favor of the e2e delay player, as seen in Section 5.3. This is due to the decrease in the wake-up period T w , the sleep period T sleep , and the frame size T frame . The simulations show that the protocols can achieve the desired trade-off and provide results close to the analytically calculated energy. All obtained gains and paid costs of each player for different configurations of the application requirements are summarized in Table IV for comparison. Although the gains and the costs between the energy and the delay players were not the same, there is a clear trading between them to achieve the desired proportional optimization. These results reveal that tuning the MAC protocols with optimized parameters gives better balance between energy efficiency and e2e delay performance.
CONCLUSION
The problem of optimizing system performance subject to conflicting needs has been targeted in this article, where a general optimization framework for duty-cycled MAC protocols in low data rate wireless networks is proposed. The energy-delay tradeoffs have been investigated from a game theory perspective and have shown how to appropriately achieve a fair trade-off between them. Different from multiobjective optimization methods, which either optimize one performance objective and treat the others as constraints of the problem, or aggregate all performance metrics into a single objective function with different weights and from the cooperative games that use the nodes as the players, we have treated the two objectives as two players in a cooperative game. We accordingly proposed an appealing method to find the fair performance trade-off between energy consumption and the e2e delay, where each of the two players reduces its cost function that is minimized with the same order of magnitude, which makes the solution equally fair. First, the players negotiate with each other to achieve an agreement under the Nash bargaining equilibrium. Then, an iterative algorithm is proposed that uses the Nash bargaining model in a repeated game to find the solution under the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining model. The framework is scalable with the number of nodes and is general enough to be applied to any wireless MAC protocol, notably those proposed for WSN. The framework has been applied to determine the optimal MAC parameters of six WSN duty-cycled MAC protocols-B-MAC, X-MAC, RI-MAC, SMAC, DMAC, and LMAC-and then to achieve a fair energy-delay trade-off in the long run according to the application requirements. Furthermore, the optimization results have been supported by extensive simulations where the MAC protocols are implemented and tuned with the corresponding optimal parameters. The energy consumption and the average e2e delay were measured and compared to the analytical results. We found that when tuning the duty-cycled MAC protocols with the optimal parameters, they map the obtained trade-off performance and confirm the effectiveness of the proposed framework. The impact of the sampling frequency was also analyzed, and we showed that the framework is able to find the maximum sampling rate that each protocol must not violate to achieve the target trade-off for a given application requirement. Finally, to demonstrate the capability of the framework to run over large networks, the optimization of different MAC protocols has been tested under increasing values of the network size. This makes it scalable and suitable for arbitrary network sizes.
Although the proposed framework allows one to optimize MAC protocols and find the fair trade-off between energy consumption and e2e delay objectives, there are some factors that have been simplified by the traffic model considered (e.g., the absence of interference and retransmissions). This hides some features of the real conditions of wireless environments that are not captured by this model. We believe that these simplifications are somehow reasonable due to the very low data rate nature of the targeted applications, where the tight traffic minimizes the impact of interferences and retransmissions due to congestion and collisions. We are working to extend this model to capture these factors and to include other kinds of traffic models, such as Poisson arrivals.
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